Optimal Decisions of a Supply Chain with Two Risk-Averse and Competing Retailers under Random Demand

الملخص EN

This paper investigates the optimal decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers who face price-sensitive and stochastic demand.

The retailers are risk averse with conditional value at risk (CVaR) as their risk measure, and the manufacturer is a risk-neutral agent.

We construct manufacturer-Stackelberg games with retailers, who engage in horizontal price competition.

For the multiplicative demand model and expected demand as an exponential function of both prices, we show that there exists the optimal pricing-ordering joint decision uniquely.

We then explore the influence of the price sensitivity, risk aversion, and retail competition on optimal decisions and channel efficiency.

The results show that retail competition contributes to manufacturer and improves channel efficiency of the decentralized supply chain.

When the retailers are more risk averse, the channel efficiency becomes much lower.

However, the level of retailers’ risk aversion has no significant impact on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and retailer’s optimal selling price.