نطاق المسؤولية الجنائية الفردية وفقا للمادة (25 )‎من النظام الأساسي للمحكمة الجنائية الدولية : دراسة تحليلية

الملخص EN

International responsibility is not limited to states any longer.

Instead, the individual has become the focus of any international legal discourse, and if any actions that represent violations or crimes affecting human rights come up from him/her, whether in exceptional cases such as the state of war in an international armed conflict or a noninternational armed conflict -the state of civil war-, he/she will be held accountable for this responsibility.

Whatever the case is, the work of international judicial institutions was a strong speech to those who committed crimes against humanity, and the Tribunal for Rwanda and Yugoslavia took this approach, with the intention of tracing the crimes that were committed against the human group.

And it is an issue in line with what the international community has called for willingly to establish an international legal and judicial system that is more effective and more firm in dealing with all types of international crimes, whether against human rights or against humanity.

The optimal picture of the international criminal responsibility of individuals is determined in the text of Article (25) of the International Criminal Court Statute, which is the critical text in defining and inculcating it.

Therefore, the legal development of the international criminal responsibility of the individual, and the legal inculcation of Article (25) of the International Criminal Court Statute were addressed.

As well as explaining the forms of individual criminal responsibility mentioned in the text of Article (25), whether the crime was committed by a single perpetrator or with participation, and the exploitation of others to commit the crime, and incitement and assistance in the commission of the crime.

And did these legal rules mentioned in Article (25) expand the scope of criminal responsibility or did they neglect that criminalization applies to some of the perpetrators of the crimes mentioned in the International Criminal Court Statute, especially committing the crime with omission.

We concluded that Article (25) did not explicitly address committing the crime by omission, which requires the necessity that criminalization applies to the perpetrators of the crime with omission, as well as the crime based on the prediction of the results whenever the perpetrator expected the result and accepted the risk.