التبرير الأخلاقي

الملخص EN

This paper discusses moral justification by looking at the practices of moral justification actions, private and public moral judgments.

Wittgenstein also says that the question of reasons loses its sense at some point in order to reach a better understanding of the cases in which the request for justification is unreasonable, and the researcher will present the cases in which justification is required, about its role and when it is accepted, why we ask for ethical reasons, and why in certain situations we feel the need to provide it ? James Tully says that our 'reasoning about the role of giving reasons' can, in a given context, be 'a reason not to arouse further suspicion'.

but sometimes not giving any reasons is the highest way of rationality (and morality)." for example, i will show the circumstances in which we usually need justifications for moral actions and judgments, and thus clarify or highlight the contradiction between the ordinary situations in which the issue of justification arises and some philosophical demands.

in order to focus our understanding of the practice of justifying moral judgments ; i will compare it to the practice of justifying empirical judgments, in particular.

i will compare the aims of these practices, the types of reasons for doubt, the forms of evidence available, and the ways in which we justify them.

after noting the differences as well as the similarities between the two processes, i will discuss and reject the alleged distinction between cognitively and morally justified moral beliefs.