حدود تحويل السلطة : دراسة في آليات النفوذ الأمريكي داخل صندوق النقد الدولي

Abstract EN

This article discusses the limits of international organizations' exercise of sovereign power.

Based on the theoretical discussion about the independence of IMF as an international organization, the article discuss the issue of the effectiveness and efficiency of transferring power from member states to the Fund, especially in light of the dominant position of the United States.

As a founding and most influential member within the fund.

The article proposes a theoretical three-level classification for the transfer of authority to the IMF, ranging from agency relations, delegation of authority, and transfer of authority, which makes the fund accountable to its lenders, Or accountable to its lenders, or independent.

On the basis of that, the article discusses the various aspects of the US domination of the IMF's policies while discussing the reforms introduced to enhance its independence.