المؤسسة العسكرية العراقية في مواجهة التنظيمات الإرهابية : عوامل الانجاز و دواعي الإخفاق

Abstract EN

When the American invasion over Iraqi country had become as a de facto, by the issuance of Security Council resolution No.

(1483) on 22 / May / 2003.

The resolution did refer to the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers.

That occupation worked at a complete demobilization of Iraqi Military Institutions, Internal Security Forces and all Iraqi state institutions.

Afterword, the American civil governor of the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, Paul Bremer, issued the Order No.

(2) under which he demobilized Iraqi Army with all its Military facilities and disbanded the ministry of defense and all ministries related to the national security as well.

Such an Order would be critical in eliminating the foundations of Iraqi State in terms of defense and security services creating chaotic status such as plundering, killing and sabotaging in order to destroy the security of the state and to vandalize the Iraqi social structure and turned it into denominational groups (i.e.

doctrinal, sectarian, clannish, etc).

When the first Iraqi government had been formed in 2004, after the occupation, Iraq was unable to establish a ministry of defense based on professional rules which led to the aggravation of terrorist organizations represented by Al-Qaeda and other armed Islamic regulations and finally the regulation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, known as (ISIS).

In the light of foregoing, the research is starting from a hypothesis whereby that " a set of factors, that the Iraqi Military Institution based on after the year of 2003, led to a series of security and defense failures which requires reconsideration of construction of Military Doctrine for such institution.