Price and Service Competition between New and Remanufactured Products

Abstract EN

This paper sets two manufacturers on the market.

One is traditional manufacturer, which produces new products, and the other remanufactures by recycling used products.

Two manufacturers sell products to customers through one retailer and also provide product-related services.

Three participators decide prices and service levels independently.

We discuss the optimal decision of prices, service levels, demands, and profits in three scenarios: Manufacturers Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Nash Equilibrium.

We also study the influence of customer acceptance of remanufactured product (θ) on participators’ decisions.

With the increase of θ, new product profit reduces; remanufactured product profit increases at the beginning and then decreases.

Retailer profit grows steadily.

In Manufacturers Stackelberg, new and remanufactured products can get the maximum profits, and retailer only has the minimum profit.

In Retailer Stackelberg, retailer can get the maximum profit; new product only has the minimum profit and remanufactured product has the medium gain.

In Nash Equilibrium, new product and retailer have the medium gains, and remanufactured product has the minimum profit.