Supplier’s Joint Investments in Cost Reduction and Quality Improvement in a Decentralized Supply Chain

Abstract EN

We consider a decentralized supply chain with a downstream manufacturer and an upstream supplier.

The upstream supplier sells a product to the manufacturer, who faces a quality and price sensitive demand.

The supplier has a chance to invest in both cost reduction and quality improvement of its product.

We derive the optimal investment and pricing decisions for the supply chain members.

We do so in both the centralized and the decentralized supply chains.

We show that the optimal investment and pricing decisions in the decentralized supply chain may deviate from that in the centralized supply chain.

We develop a mechanism to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.

The developed mechanism contains four policies: wholesale price, sharing of revenue, sharing of cost reduction investment cost, and sharing of quality improvement investment cost.

We also show that the developed coordination mechanism can lead to Pareto improvement.