عملية صنع قرار حرب حزيران يونيو 1967 في إسرائيل

Abstract EN

The official Israeli narrative of the June 1967 War depicts the country as having been dragged unwillingly into a conflict for which it had not planned.

A close inspection of a number of detailed sources, scattered across a variety of published Hebrew materials, paint a picture entirely at odds with such a claim however.

In this paper, the author addresses the Israeli decision to go to war in June 1967 by examining the steps taken by the Israeli government—legally, the only body mandated to declare war.

The author also examines the developments in the stance taken by the Israeli military command, which was instrumental in the decision to go to war.

At the time, the Israeli military worked to create the right opportunity to declare war, refusing to accept any attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict and coerced the government into war through a variety of means.