الاستقلال الفعلي لمحافظ البنك المركزي العراقي للمدة من 2003-2017 : مدخل الاقتصاد السياسي

Abstract EN

In order to reach the reality of the independence of the Governors of the Central Bank of Iraq for the period 2003-2017, a period that has experienced political changes, the researcher used two main comparisons: The first is the comparison between the legal independence of the central bank governors and the actual independence, Through the indicators of appointment and removal and the duration of the survival of governors, government representation, and the working in another institution.

The second is the comparison between the turnover rate of primates and the turnover rate of the governors in order to reach the partisan affiliation of the governors and their relation to the executive authority, and the impact on their appointment and removal.

The main findings of the research were that the rise of legal independence is not reflected in actual independence, and that there is a deficiency in the law of the Central Bank, which requires the completion of the conditions of actual independence, the research also concluded the principle of the transitional governor, who is the governor for a transitional period with high turnover rate, between the removal of a non-ally governor and the appointment of an ally's governor