Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions
المؤلفون المشاركون
Lee, Sing-Ling
Tsung, Chen-Kun
Ho, Hann-Jang
المصدر
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
العدد
المجلد 2013، العدد 2013 (31 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2013)، ص ص. 1-8، 8ص.
الناشر
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
تاريخ النشر
2013-11-17
دولة النشر
مصر
عدد الصفحات
8
التخصصات الرئيسية
الملخص EN
To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices.
The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding.
However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers.
The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding.
We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies.
In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers.
In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP) is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness.
Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability.
Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations.
First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value.
The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.
نمط استشهاد جمعية علماء النفس الأمريكية (APA)
Tsung, Chen-Kun& Ho, Hann-Jang& Lee, Sing-Ling. 2013. Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008696
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الأمريكية للغات الحديثة (MLA)
Tsung, Chen-Kun…[et al.]. Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2013 (2013), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008696
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الطبية الأمريكية (AMA)
Tsung, Chen-Kun& Ho, Hann-Jang& Lee, Sing-Ling. Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2013. Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008696
نوع البيانات
مقالات
لغة النص
الإنجليزية
الملاحظات
Includes bibliographical references
رقم السجل
BIM-1008696
قاعدة معامل التأثير والاستشهادات المرجعية العربي "ارسيف Arcif"
أضخم قاعدة بيانات عربية للاستشهادات المرجعية للمجلات العلمية المحكمة الصادرة في العالم العربي
تقوم هذه الخدمة بالتحقق من التشابه أو الانتحال في الأبحاث والمقالات العلمية والأطروحات الجامعية والكتب والأبحاث باللغة العربية، وتحديد درجة التشابه أو أصالة الأعمال البحثية وحماية ملكيتها الفكرية. تعرف اكثر