Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game

المؤلفون المشاركون

Corazzini, Luca
Tyszler, Marcelo

المصدر

Journal of Applied Mathematics

العدد

المجلد 2015، العدد 2015 (31 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2015)، ص ص. 1-8، 8ص.

الناشر

Hindawi Publishing Corporation

تاريخ النشر

2015-09-01

دولة النشر

مصر

عدد الصفحات

8

التخصصات الرئيسية

الرياضيات

الملخص EN

By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in public good games.

In the benchmark specification, homogeneous agents, overcontribution is mainly explainedby error and noise in behavior.

Results change when we consider a more general QRE specification with cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for (group) efficiency.

In this case, we find that the majority of the subjects make contributions that are compatible with the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency.

A likelihood-ratio test confirms the superiority of the more general specification of the QRE model over alternative specifications.

نمط استشهاد جمعية علماء النفس الأمريكية (APA)

Corazzini, Luca& Tyszler, Marcelo. 2015. Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game. Journal of Applied Mathematics،Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1067161

نمط استشهاد الجمعية الأمريكية للغات الحديثة (MLA)

Corazzini, Luca& Tyszler, Marcelo. Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game. Journal of Applied Mathematics No. 2015 (2015), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1067161

نمط استشهاد الجمعية الطبية الأمريكية (AMA)

Corazzini, Luca& Tyszler, Marcelo. Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game. Journal of Applied Mathematics. 2015. Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1067161

نوع البيانات

مقالات

لغة النص

الإنجليزية

الملاحظات

Includes bibliographical references

رقم السجل

BIM-1067161