Smuggling : an economic and strategic alternative (when, why, and how ?)‎

الملخص EN

Almost all literature in security and strategic studies deal with smuggling as an economic, social, or security problem that needs to be tackled by national and coordinated international measures.

However, this research paper addresses this phenomenon from a different perspective, as it assumes that smuggling can offer economic or strategic values for a state.

It attempts to answer the following question: How, when and to what extent can smuggling be economically and strategically significant for the state? In order to answer this question, this research paper initially presents a theoretical framework for smuggling, which covers various definitions for the phenomenon, its different types, and its drivers.

Then, it examines some of its security implications that concern state officials and security and military agencies.

Finally, it investigates the different cases where smuggling can be beneficial from economic and strategic terms.

The paper concludes that smuggling can be an option for states under sanctions to circumvent their subversive effects.

It may also be a crucial way to deliver military and logistic support to proxies.

Moreover, many “rogue states” pursuing nuclear weapons had relied on black markets conducted by smuggling networks to have an access to nuclear-related devices or fissile materials.

In addition, some states tend to tolerate smuggling activities across its borders either as an option to reduce unemployment and poverty rates in its neglected border areas or as a way of leverage against its neighbors or rivals.