Effectiveness of Punishment and Operating Subsidy in Supervision of China’s Pension PPP Projects: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis
المؤلفون المشاركون
المصدر
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
العدد
المجلد 2019، العدد 2019 (31 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2019)، ص ص. 1-12، 12ص.
الناشر
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
تاريخ النشر
2019-11-28
دولة النشر
مصر
عدد الصفحات
12
التخصصات الرئيسية
الملخص EN
Aiming at solving problems of service quality supervision in China’s pension PPP projects, this paper mainly analyses the influences of “punishment” and “operating subsidy” on the evolutionary stability strategies of both players through constructing an evolutionary game model between private investors and government regulators.
The results show that improving operating subsidy can effectively motivate private investors to improve service quality, and under the active supervision of government regulators, increasing punishment can restrain private investors from violating rules.
If government regulators fail to perform their duties, however, punishment will be ineffective to private investors who have broken the rules.
Therefore, the Chinese government should take appropriate measures to improve the sense of responsibility of government regulators who appropriately punish private investors providing low-quality services and appropriately increase operating subsidies to private investors offering high-quality services.
نمط استشهاد جمعية علماء النفس الأمريكية (APA)
Yue, Xianghua& Lin, Yuming. 2019. Effectiveness of Punishment and Operating Subsidy in Supervision of China’s Pension PPP Projects: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2019, no. 2019, pp.1-12.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1200759
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الأمريكية للغات الحديثة (MLA)
Yue, Xianghua& Lin, Yuming. Effectiveness of Punishment and Operating Subsidy in Supervision of China’s Pension PPP Projects: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2019 (2019), pp.1-12.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1200759
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الطبية الأمريكية (AMA)
Yue, Xianghua& Lin, Yuming. Effectiveness of Punishment and Operating Subsidy in Supervision of China’s Pension PPP Projects: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2019. Vol. 2019, no. 2019, pp.1-12.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1200759
نوع البيانات
مقالات
لغة النص
الإنجليزية
الملاحظات
Includes bibliographical references
رقم السجل
BIM-1200759
قاعدة معامل التأثير والاستشهادات المرجعية العربي "ارسيف Arcif"
أضخم قاعدة بيانات عربية للاستشهادات المرجعية للمجلات العلمية المحكمة الصادرة في العالم العربي
تقوم هذه الخدمة بالتحقق من التشابه أو الانتحال في الأبحاث والمقالات العلمية والأطروحات الجامعية والكتب والأبحاث باللغة العربية، وتحديد درجة التشابه أو أصالة الأعمال البحثية وحماية ملكيتها الفكرية. تعرف اكثر