Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory
المؤلفون المشاركون
Liu, Yu
Cai, Dong
Guo, Chunxiang
Huang, Haizhen
المصدر
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
العدد
المجلد 2020، العدد 2020 (31 ديسمبر/كانون الأول 2020)، ص ص. 1-10، 10ص.
الناشر
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
تاريخ النشر
2020-11-28
دولة النشر
مصر
عدد الصفحات
10
التخصصات الرئيسية
الملخص EN
Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games.
The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building.
In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines.
Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings.
The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings.
It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.
نمط استشهاد جمعية علماء النفس الأمريكية (APA)
Liu, Yu& Cai, Dong& Guo, Chunxiang& Huang, Haizhen. 2020. Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1201772
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الأمريكية للغات الحديثة (MLA)
Liu, Yu…[et al.]. Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2020 (2020), pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1201772
نمط استشهاد الجمعية الطبية الأمريكية (AMA)
Liu, Yu& Cai, Dong& Guo, Chunxiang& Huang, Haizhen. Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2020. Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1201772
نوع البيانات
مقالات
لغة النص
الإنجليزية
الملاحظات
Includes bibliographical references
رقم السجل
BIM-1201772
قاعدة معامل التأثير والاستشهادات المرجعية العربي "ارسيف Arcif"
أضخم قاعدة بيانات عربية للاستشهادات المرجعية للمجلات العلمية المحكمة الصادرة في العالم العربي
تقوم هذه الخدمة بالتحقق من التشابه أو الانتحال في الأبحاث والمقالات العلمية والأطروحات الجامعية والكتب والأبحاث باللغة العربية، وتحديد درجة التشابه أو أصالة الأعمال البحثية وحماية ملكيتها الفكرية. تعرف اكثر