Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

الملخص EN

Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships.

Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables.

The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation.

The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government.

Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.