Lightweight Privacy Preservation for Securing Large-Scale Database-Driven Cognitive Radio Networks with Location Verification

الملخص EN

The database-driven cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are regarded as a promising approach to utilizing limited spectrum resources in large-scale Internet of Things (IoT).

However, database-driven CRNs face some security and privacy threats.

Firstly, secondary users (SUs) should send identity and location information to the database (DB) to obtain a list of available channels, such that the curious DB might easily misuse and threaten the privacy of SUs.

Secondly, malicious SUs might send fake location information to the DB in order to occupy channels with better quantity in advance and so gain benefits.

This might also cause serious interference to primary users (PUs).

In this paper, we propose a lightweight privacy-preserving location verification protocol to protect the identity and location privacy of each SU and to verify the location of SUs.

In the proposed protocol, the SU does not need to provide location information to request an available channel from the DB.

Therefore, the DB cannot get the location information of any SU.

In the proposed protocol, the base station (BS) selects some SUs as witnesses to generate location proofs for each other in a distributed fashion.

This new witness selection mechanism makes the proposed protocol reliable when a malicious SU generates fake location information to cheat the BS and also prevents SU-Witness collusion attacks.

The results also show that the proposed protocol can provide strong privacy preservation for SUs and can effectively verify the location of the SUs.

The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol can resist various types of attacks.

Moreover, compared with previous protocols, the proposed protocol is lightweight because it relies on symmetric cryptography and it is unaffected by the area covered by the DB.