Provoking the Adversary by Detecting Eavesdropping and Jamming Attacks: A Game-Theoretical Framework

الملخص EN

This paper investigates the secrecy and reliability of a communication where the user is assisting an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in detecting the adversary’s attack.

The adversary is assumed to be sophisticated such that it can conduct eavesdropping and jamming attacks.

The IDS is equipped with the capability of detecting both of those attacks.

Two scenarios were considered; the first scenario is that the user is trying to detect the adversary by assisting the IDS, and the second scenario is that the user is equipped with a silent time slot in its communication protocol besides assisting the IDS, in order to provoke the adversary into jamming the channel, thus detecting it with a higher probability.

Interestingly, adding the capability of detecting eavesdropping attacks pushed the adversary into conducting jamming attacks much more, thus aiding in detecting the adversary earlier.

All of that was modeled by means of stochastic game theory, in order to analyze and study the behavior and the interactions between the user and the adversary.

Results show a major improvement in the first scenario by 188% and an improvement by 294% in the second scenario in the game value when the probability of detecting eavesdropping attacks was 0.3, which represents the payoff that the user gains in terms of secrecy and reliability.