Ownership concentration, choice of auditors, and firm performance : evidence from the Mena Region

مقدم أطروحة جامعية

al-Qasimi, Yusuf

مشرف أطروحة جامعية

Faruq, Umar

الجامعة

جامعة الأخوين

الكلية

كلية إدارة الأعمال

دولة الجامعة

المغرب

الدرجة العلمية

ماجستير

تاريخ الدرجة العلمية

2010

الملخص الإنجليزي

How does ownership concentration affect firm performance in emerging markets? On one hand, concentrated ownership leads to higher agency problems, and on the other hand, it minimizes agency problems by removing the free-rider problem.

Using a large dataset of ownership concentration and firm performance from the MENA region during the time period between 2004 and 2008, we find that ownership concentration, as itself, may not have a significant impact on firm performance.

It is, rather, the way the concentrated firms govern themselves that determines their performance.

We argue that firms are aware of the agency problems that result from ownership concentration.

Therefore, they try to send some credible signals, for example the appointment of big-four auditors, to the markets.

Appointment of big-four auditors signals to the market that the information being disclosed by firm is reliable and thus reduces some of the agency problems.

Our results show a significantly positive relationship between ownership concentration and the choice of auditor.

We also show that a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance becomes insignificant as we control for the choice of auditor in our analysis.

Our results document a significantly positive relationship between the appointment of one of a big-four auditor and the firm performance.

التخصصات الرئيسية

إدارة الأعمال
العلوم المالية و المحاسبية

الموضوعات

• المحاسبة
• المنشآت التجارية
• التقييم
• الشرق الأوسط
• الأداء

عدد الصفحات

25

قائمة المحتويات

• APA
• MLA
• AMA

لغة النص

الإنجليزية

نوع البيانات

رسائل جامعية

رقم السجل

BIM-627425