A secure electronic voting scheme based on Evox-MA and REVS E voting blind signature protocols

مقدم أطروحة جامعية

al-Saidi, Rim Ali

مشرف أطروحة جامعية

Shilbayah, Nidal F.

أعضاء اللجنة

Alya, Muhammad F.
al-Fawair, Ziyad Mahmud

الجامعة

جامعة الشرق الأوسط

الكلية

كلية تكنولوجيا المعلومات

القسم الأكاديمي

قسم علم الحاسوب

دولة الجامعة

الأردن

الدرجة العلمية

ماجستير

تاريخ الدرجة العلمية

2011

الملخص الإنجليزي

Voting is one of the most important activities in a democratic society.

In a traditional voting environment voting process sometimes becomes quite inconvenient due to the reluctance of certain voters to visit a polling booth to cast votes besides involving huge social and human resources.

The development of computer networks and elaboration of cryptographic techniques facilitate the deployment of E voting.

In this work the researcher propose a secure E voting scheme that is suitable for large scale voting over the Internet.

The scheme depends on the last two E voting protocols based on the blind signature, Evox-MA and REVS; it encompasses three distinct phases- that of registration phase, voting phase and counting phase.

Each phase applies some cryptographic technique, schemes or modified protocols to enhance some security aspects as a Kerberos authentication protocol, PVID scheme, responder certificate validation.

The theoretical proof and simulation results show that the scheme satisfies all E voting security requirements.

By applying a PVSS, the researcher get more stable results than REVS blind signature protocol which suggested using a different password for each administrator.

Also the proposed scheme adds more security enhancements.

First, by applying more than one scheme, the Kerberos authentication protocol (it has been modified by adding a new entity (responder) derived from the OSCP-KIS protocol to verify voter certificate validity), PVID scheme and the converted Ferguson E cash protocol the researcher guarantee that only authorized voter vote.

Therefore, limit the DoS attack against attackers, so the counter buffer will never be filled with a garbage votes.

Second, detecting the double voting issued by the voters, by applying more than one mechanism (the converted Ferguson E cash protocol to operate under E voting, trapdoor commitment scheme, and modified PVID scheme.

Finally, allow a valid vote to be repeated if fault tolerance occurred by applying a trapdoor commitment scheme.

التخصصات الرئيسية

تكنولوجيا المعلومات وعلم الحاسوب

عدد الصفحات

126

قائمة المحتويات

• APA
• MLA
• AMA

لغة النص

الإنجليزية

نوع البيانات

رسائل جامعية

رقم السجل

BIM-694007