Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach
Joint Authors
Source
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Issue
Vol. 2013, Issue 2013 (31 Dec. 2013), pp.1-13, 13 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2013-05-21
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
13
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
Today developed and developing countries have to admit the fact that global warming is affecting the earth, but the fundamental problem of how to divide up necessary greenhouse gas reductions between developed and developing countries remains.
In this paper, we propose cooperative and noncooperative stochastic differential game models to describe greenhouse gas emissions decision makings of developed and developing countries, calculate their feedback Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution, characterize parameter spaces that developed and developing countries can cooperate, design cooperative conditions under which participants buy the cooperative payoff, and distribute the cooperative payoff with Nash bargaining solution.
Lastly, numerical simulations are employed to illustrate the above results.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Yu, Wei& Xin, Baogui. 2013. Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-13.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008999
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Yu, Wei& Xin, Baogui. Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2013 (2013), pp.1-13.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008999
American Medical Association (AMA)
Yu, Wei& Xin, Baogui. Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2013. Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-13.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1008999
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1008999