Pricing Models of e-Books When Competing with p-Books

Abstract EN

With the rise in popularity of e-books, there is a growing need to reexamine the pricing strategy in the e-book supply chain.

In this paper, we study two forms of pricing models widely used in the book industry: wholesale and agency pricing models.

We first assume a stylized deterministic demand model in which the demand depends on the price, the degree of substitution, and the overall market potential.

Subsequently, we employ the game theory to determine the price equilibriums and profit distribution under different pricing models.

Finally, we explore the behavior of the publisher and the retailer under different preferences and degrees of substitution through a computational study.

Our findings indicate that the e-book price will be lower under the agency pricing model than under the wholesale pricing model, which is counterintuitive.

The publishers have higher incentives to adopt the agency pricing model than the wholesale pricing model.

The agency pricing model benefits the whole system and can provide readers with books at lower prices.

The degree of substitution between the two forms of books and the readers’ preference toward e-book will affect the books’ price and the profit distribution between the publisher and the retailers.