Coordination Scheme for Restructuring Business Operation of the Single Period Newsvendor Problem

Abstract EN

This paper presents a coordination scheme for a single period newsvendor problem when both supplier and retailer of the supply chain agree to change the business operation from a market decision power sharing system (Model 1) to a unique decision maker system (Model 2).

The supplier is assumed to be a risk-averse decision maker and he will undertake the product quality risk in both models.

Model 1 is game theoretic, where the supplier controls the wholesale price, but the retailer controls the order quantity and market price.

The bargaining process ends when the supplier has found a wholesale price that maximizes the value of his sales revenue minus the product quality cost.

Model 2 is a centralized system where the supplier possesses all decision powers of the market.

In general, Model 2 will generate higher total revenue than Model 1.

The aim of this research is to propose a satisfying compromise based on consignment policy to resolve the revenue-sharing conflict in Model 2 due to the additional revenue.

An example is provided to illustrate the two models and the proposed coordination scheme, along with managerial insights on the models’ benefits.

The impacts of several parameters on the scheme are also presented and discussed.