A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
Joint Authors
Wei-sheng, Xu
Qi-di, Wu
Meng, Lingpeng
Kang, Qi
Han, Chuanfeng
Source
Issue
Vol. 2013, Issue 2013 (31 Dec. 2013), pp.1-10, 10 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2013-12-28
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
10
Main Subjects
Medicine
Information Technology and Computer Science
Abstract EN
This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities.
We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently.
We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed.
The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Meng, Lingpeng& Kang, Qi& Han, Chuanfeng& Wei-sheng, Xu& Qi-di, Wu. 2013. A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources. The Scientific World Journal،Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1033261
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Meng, Lingpeng…[et al.]. A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources. The Scientific World Journal No. 2013 (2013), pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1033261
American Medical Association (AMA)
Meng, Lingpeng& Kang, Qi& Han, Chuanfeng& Wei-sheng, Xu& Qi-di, Wu. A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources. The Scientific World Journal. 2013. Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1033261
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1033261
