A Provably Secure Revocable ID-Based Authenticated Group Key Exchange Protocol with Identifying Malicious Participants

Abstract EN

The existence of malicious participants is a major threat for authenticated group key exchange (AGKE) protocols.

Typically, there are two detecting ways (passive and active) to resist malicious participants in AGKE protocols.

In 2012, the revocable identity- (ID-) based public key system (R-IDPKS) was proposed to solve the revocation problem in the ID-based public key system (IDPKS).

Afterwards, based on the R-IDPKS, Wu et al.

proposed a revocable ID-based AGKE (RID-AGKE) protocol, which adopted a passive detecting way to resist malicious participants.

However, it needs three rounds and cannot identify malicious participants.

In this paper, we fuse a noninteractive confirmed computation technique to propose the first two-round RID-AGKE protocol with identifying malicious participants, which is an active detecting way.

We demonstrate that our protocol is a provably secure AGKE protocol with forward secrecy and can identify malicious participants.

When compared with the recently proposed ID/RID-AGKE protocols, our protocol possesses better performance and more robust security properties.