The Optimal Licensing Contract in a Differentiated Stackelberg Model

Abstract EN

This paper extends the work of Wang (2002) by considering a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm is an inside innovator and licenses its new technology by three options, that is, fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, and two-part tariff licensing.

The main contributions and conclusions of this paper are threefold.

First of all, this paper derives a very different result from Wang (2002).

We show that, with a nondrastic innovation, royalty licensing is always better than fixed-fee licensing for the innovator; with a drastic innovation, royalty licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing for small values of substitution coefficient d; however when d becomes closer to 1, neither fee nor royalty licensing will occur.

Secondly, this paper shows that the innovator is always better off in case of two-part tariff licensing than fixed-fee licensing no matter what the innovation size is.

Thirdly, the innovator always prefers to license its nondrastic innovation by means of a two-part tariff instead of licensing by means of a royalty; however, with a drastic innovation, the optimal licensing strategy can be either a two-part tariff or a royalty, depending upon the differentiation of the goods.