Dynamics in Braess Paradox with Nonimpulsive Commuters

Abstract EN

In Braess paradox the addiction of an extra resource creates a social dilemma in whichthe individual rationality leads to collective irrationality.

In the literature, the dynamics has been analyzed when considering impulsive commuters, i.e., those who switch choice regardless of the actual difference between costs.

We analyze a dynamical version of the paradox with nonimpulsive commuters, who change road proportionally to the cost difference.

When only two roads are available, we provide a rigorous proof of the existence of a unique fixed point showing that it is globally attracting even if locally unstable.

When a new road is added the system becomes discontinuous and two-dimensional.

We prove that still a unique fixed point exists, and its global attractivity is numerically evidenced, also when the fixed point is locally unstable.

Our analysis adds a new insight in the understanding of dynamics in social dilemma.