Coopetition in Intermodal Freight Transport Services

Abstract EN

The paper studies the coopetition of the downstream different carriers by providing complementary transport services in intermodal freight transport chain.

Considering different information structure, a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous actions on investment and price is first formulated.

Equilibria show both parties have motivation to select coopetition even if the agreement for cooperation investment is reached in advance.

When both firms agree on the specific allocation, the new coopetition with higher efficiency would be emerged.

Moreover, we analyze the complexity and evolution of coopetition by repeated pricing game with finitely and infinitely time horizon.

In the finitely repeated pricing game, both firms have incentive to reach a tacit understanding to alternate choosing price cooperation and competition after setting suitable allocation scheme; the repeated periods t are then going to be an issue.

In the infinitely repeated pricing game, the perfect cooperation is realized by designing the suitable trigger strategy.