Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

Abstract EN

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks.

However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs).

In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information.

By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed.

To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios.

Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.