Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort
Joint Authors
Source
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Issue
Vol. 2015, Issue 2015 (31 Dec. 2015), pp.1-7, 7 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2015-03-25
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
7
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
This paper investigates optimal decisions in a two-stage fashion product supply chain under two specified contracts: revenue-sharing contract and wholesale price contract, where demand is dependent on retailing price and sales effort level.
Optimal decisions and related profits are analyzed and further compared among the cases where the effort investment fee is determined and undertaken either by the retailer or the manufacturer.
Results reveal that if the retailer determines the effort investment level, she would be better off under the wholesale price contract and would invest more effort.
However, if the manufacturer determines the effort level, he prefers to the revenue-sharing contract most likely if both parties agree on consignment.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Wei, Ying& Xiong, Liyang. 2015. Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-7.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073071
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Wei, Ying& Xiong, Liyang. Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2015 (2015), pp.1-7.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073071
American Medical Association (AMA)
Wei, Ying& Xiong, Liyang. Contracting Fashion Products Supply Chains When Demand Is Dependent on Price and Sales Effort. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2015. Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-7.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073071
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1073071