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Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction
Joint Authors
Source
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Issue
Vol. 2015, Issue 2015 (31 Dec. 2015), pp.1-9, 9 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2015-10-08
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
9
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
We analyze the generalized first-price auction under incomplete information setting.
Without setting a reserve price, the efficient symmetrical Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized and found to be increasing as the number of bidders is sufficiently large.
Then, the explicit expression for the expected revenue of the search engine is found and the effect of the click rates of all the positions on the expected revenue is obtained.
Finally, with setting of the reserve price, we have found the optimal reserve price and examine how the difference of the search engine’s revenues with setting reserve price and without setting reserve price varies with the reserve price.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Han, Xiaohu& Liu, Shulin. 2015. Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073460
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Han, Xiaohu& Liu, Shulin. Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2015 (2015), pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073460
American Medical Association (AMA)
Han, Xiaohu& Liu, Shulin. Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2015. Vol. 2015, no. 2015, pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1073460
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1073460