Robust and Efficient Authentication Scheme for Session Initiation Protocol

Abstract EN

The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a powerful application-layer protocol which is used as a signaling one for establishing, modifying, and terminating sessions among participants.

Authentication is becoming an increasingly crucial issue when a user asks to access SIP services.

Hitherto, many authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance the security of SIP.

In 2014, Arshad and Nikooghadam proposed an enhanced authentication and key agreement scheme for SIP and claimed that their scheme could withstand various attacks.

However, in this paper, we show that Arshad and Nikooghadam’s authentication scheme is still susceptible to key-compromise impersonation and trace attacks and does not provide proper mutual authentication.

To conquer the flaws, we propose a secure and efficient ECC-based authentication scheme for SIP.

Through the informal and formal security analyses, we demonstrate that our scheme is resilient to possible known attacks including the attacks found in Arshad et al.’s scheme.

In addition, the performance analysis shows that our scheme has similar or better efficiency in comparison with other existing ECC-based authentication schemes for SIP.