Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs

Abstract EN

Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on a bimatrix game where the payoffs in the bimatrix game are characterized by triangular fuzzy variables.

First, we define three solution concepts of credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria, and their existence theorems are presented.

Then, three sufficient and necessary conditions are given to find the credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria.

Moreover, the relationship among the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria is discussed in detail.

Finally, for 2×2 bimatix game with triangular fuzzy payoffs, we investigate the effect of loss aversion coefficients and confidence levels on the three credibilistic loss aversion Nash equilibria.

It is found that an increase of loss aversion levels of a player leads to a decrease of his/her own payoff.

We also find that the equilibrium utilities of players are decreasing (increasing) as their own confidence levels when players employ the optimistic (pessimistic) value criterion.