The independence of the central bank as an effective input to the drawing and implementation of monetary policy : germanic central bank study as a model

Abstract EN

The importance of the independence of central banks has become one of the main issues on the banking front.

Many economists support the central bank's independence in the field of monetary policy, based on the fact that its credibility and ability to achieve the goal of price stability will be better if the degree of independence of the central bank The government's bank can not commit itself in a credible manner to stabilize prices because economic agents will notice inconsistencies in its statements and actions and thus lose confidence in its commitment to achieving such a goal.

A good example of this was the German central bank's move in 1991, when it realized that it was facing increasing inflationary pressures.

It could have reduced the monetary mass and increased short-term interest rates so as to stop the acceleration of inflationary pressures, which would have been at the expense of production and employment.

He chose to confront inflation gradually in order to maintain output and employment levels.

Is it true that with the independence of central banks there may be quality and effectiveness in the application of monetary policy other than a set of procedures and laws?