Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition
Joint Authors
Song, Qi-Qing
Jiang, Yi-rong
Zhang, Wei-li
Source
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Issue
Vol. 2019, Issue 2019 (31 Dec. 2019), pp.1-8, 8 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2019-06-25
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
8
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods.
One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price.
It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given.
Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium.
If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it.
The results are verified by numerical simulations.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Zhang, Wei-li& Song, Qi-Qing& Jiang, Yi-rong. 2019. Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society،Vol. 2019, no. 2019, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1146651
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Zhang, Wei-li…[et al.]. Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society No. 2019 (2019), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1146651
American Medical Association (AMA)
Zhang, Wei-li& Song, Qi-Qing& Jiang, Yi-rong. Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society. 2019. Vol. 2019, no. 2019, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1146651
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1146651
