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Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain
Joint Authors
Guo, Hongmei
Gu, Shuiliang
Su, Yingsheng
Source
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Issue
Vol. 2018, Issue 2018 (31 Dec. 2018), pp.1-9, 9 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2018-01-29
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
9
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment.
The results found that the manufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved.
The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved.
A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Guo, Hongmei& Gu, Shuiliang& Su, Yingsheng. 2018. Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society،Vol. 2018, no. 2018, pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1152330
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Guo, Hongmei…[et al.]. Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society No. 2018 (2018), pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1152330
American Medical Association (AMA)
Guo, Hongmei& Gu, Shuiliang& Su, Yingsheng. Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society. 2018. Vol. 2018, no. 2018, pp.1-9.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1152330
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1152330