Low Carbon Distribution Channel Coordination with a Capital-Constrained Retailer

Abstract EN

Capital constraints exist in many supply chains.

We examine a low carbon distribution channel that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the retailer is constrained by capital.

The retailer can be financed by bank credit from a competitive bank market.

A Stackelberg model is developed to analyze the integrated decision-making process of ordering, financing, and emission reduction.

By comparing the decentralized and centralized channels, we obtain that the manufacturer’s green technology investment should be linearly proportional to the retailer’s order quantity in both channels.

Thus, a large order quantity leads to increased efforts to reduce emissions.

Results further show that the centralized channel in some cases has fewer emissions and can generate more profits for the whole supply chain compared with the decentralized channel.

We therefore propose a revenue sharing contract with a function form to coordinate the distribution channel.

When the government allocates appropriate quotas to the supply chain, high carbon price can benefit the environment and supply chain efficiency.