The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity
Joint Authors
Source
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Issue
Vol. 2020, Issue 2020 (31 Dec. 2020), pp.1-11, 11 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2020-09-25
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
11
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered.
On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved.
The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium.
The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium.
The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is.
As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market.
Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Yu, Yu& Xu, Jia-Qian. 2020. The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society،Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-11.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1153462
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Yu, Yu& Xu, Jia-Qian. The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society No. 2020 (2020), pp.1-11.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1153462
American Medical Association (AMA)
Yu, Yu& Xu, Jia-Qian. The Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games with Policymaker Cost and Competition Intensity. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society. 2020. Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-11.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1153462
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1153462