The obstacles of internal audit in the assessment of the variable part of executive remuneration : exploratory study in joint-stock companies in Algeria

Abstract EN

To minimize the risks associated with the opportunistic behaviors of managers, in particular the risks associated with their remuneration, a corporate governance strategy must put in place several control mechanisms, among these mechanisms, internal audit.

But the problematic is the independence or not of this control mechanism.

For this, the objective of this article aims to study the obstacles of internal audit in its mission of evaluating the methods used by senior executives to achieve the objectives related to the variable part of their remuneration, in Joint stock companies in Algeria.

In this context, we used a quantitative descriptive method in the form of a survey, the results were processed and analyzed by the SPSS software.

The results obtained show that the hierarchical reattachment of the IA to the CEO and the combined functions of the CEO hamper the role of the auditor in his mission of auditing remuneration.