A Decision-Making Model for Deterring Food Vendors from Selling Harmless Low-Quality Foods as High-Quality Foods to Consumers

Abstract EN

For certain types of foods, food vendors often label low-quality foods that are harmless to human health as foods of excellent quality and sell these falsely labeled products to consumers.

Because this type of food poses no harm to human health, when public health units discover their act of false labeling or food adulteration, vendors are only penalized with a fine rather than having them assume criminal liability.

Upon discovering vendors act of falsely labeling food, public health units typically punish the involved parties according to the extent of false labeling.

Such static protective measure is ineffective.

Instead, the extent of punishment should be based not only on the extent of false labeling, but also on the frequency of food sampling as well as the number of samples obtained for food inspections.

Only through this dynamic approach can food adulteration or false labeling be effectively prevented.

Adopting the standpoint of the public sector in food safety management, this study developed a mathematical model that facilitates discussion on the aforementioned problems.

Furthermore, we discussed how the supply-demand environmental factors of the food market are influenced by the administrative means that the public health units have used to prevent food false labeling.