Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents
Joint Authors
Zhong, Chongyi
Yang, Hui
Wang, Chun
Source
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Issue
Vol. 2020, Issue 2020 (31 Dec. 2020), pp.1-8, 8 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2020-04-09
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
8
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
We consider stability of equilibria for population games against slight perturbation on the social state space.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria for perturbed population games, which is very important and interesting.
Then, refinements of equilibria for population games are introduced.
Equivalent characterizations of perfect equilibrium are given.
At last, it is shown that each population game admits at least one perfect (proper, weakly proper, and robust) equilibrium.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Zhong, Chongyi& Yang, Hui& Wang, Chun. 2020. Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1193360
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Zhong, Chongyi…[et al.]. Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2020 (2020), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1193360
American Medical Association (AMA)
Zhong, Chongyi& Yang, Hui& Wang, Chun. Refinements of Equilibria for Population Games Based on Bounded Rationality of Agents. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2020. Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1193360
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-1193360