Three-Echelon Supply Chain Contractual Coordination with Loss-Averse Multiple Retailer Preference

Abstract EN

In this paper, we propose a supply chain contract model aimed to coordinate a three-echelon supply chain, which is based on the revenue-sharing allocation with loss-aversion preference.

We consider a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer, a risk-neutral distributor, and loss-averse multiple retailers.

To address this model, we consider a shortage product produced and sold within a single period in the stochastic market.

The model allows the system efficiency to be achieved as well as it will improve the profits of all supply chain members by tuning the contract parameters.

We used the expected utility function to describe the loss-aversion member’s influence coefficient.

The decisions of chain members under different conditions are studied by simulation analyses.

The paper also analysed the relationship between different revenue-sharing coefficient combinations with multiple retailers in the supply chain system.

Furthermore, the study has addressed the supply chain coordination decision bias in the centralized and decentralized systems.