Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion

Joint Authors

Zhao, Weiliang
Liu, Lu
Qi, Linming
Jiang, Liwen
Wang, Zicheng

Source

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

Issue

Vol. 2020, Issue 2020 (31 Dec. 2020), pp.1-17, 17 p.

Publisher

Hindawi Publishing Corporation

Publication Date

2020-03-24

Country of Publication

Egypt

No. of Pages

17

Main Subjects

Civil Engineering

Abstract EN

Many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with capital constraints often have no access or find it costly to obtain a loan from a bank; the retailer tends to borrow money from other enterprises in the supply chain by trade credit financing.

We consider an emission-dependent supply chain with one emission-dependent manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer in need of financing to explore the optimal operational and environmental strategies of a low-carbon supply chain under trade credit financing.

We use a Stackelberg game model to depict the low-carbon supply chain.

We analyse the optimal carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity in the equilibrium state.

The impacts of key parameters, such as the retailer’s internal working capital, the manufacturer’s risk-aversion degree, and the carbon-trading price on the supply chain operation, are analysed.

The results show that the retailer’s capital constraint causes the carbon-emission reduction effort, wholesale price, and order quantity to improve synchronously.

The supply chain achieves a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and the retailer when the capital-constrained retailer is funded via trade credit from the manufacturer.

The in-depth development of financing is beneficial to the manufacturer but is a disadvantage for the retailer.

When the initial carbon-emission quota is low, the manufacturer benefits from a relatively lower carbon-trading price.

Otherwise, a higher carbon-trading price is better for the manufacturer.

The “carbon-trading price trap” ensures that the retailer’s profit is minimal.

We further investigate the scenario in which the manufacturer is risk averse and find that the retailer will purchase fewer products and that the manufacturer will gain less profit to decrease the carbon-emission reduction effort.

The manufacturer’s risk aversion is unfavourable to both the economic and environmental outcomes of the whole supply chain.

This research provides strategic support for a low-carbon supply chain to carry out operational decisions in the context of enterprise capital constraint.

To examine the theoretical results, the data used in the existing literature are further used to simulate the corresponding conclusions.

Our research enriches the existing supply chain finance literature and provides decision support for the supply chain core enterprise.

American Psychological Association (APA)

Qi, Linming& Liu, Lu& Jiang, Liwen& Wang, Zicheng& Zhao, Weiliang. 2020. Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-17.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1202303

Modern Language Association (MLA)

Qi, Linming…[et al.]. Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2020 (2020), pp.1-17.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1202303

American Medical Association (AMA)

Qi, Linming& Liu, Lu& Jiang, Liwen& Wang, Zicheng& Zhao, Weiliang. Optimal Operation Strategies under a Carbon Cap-and-Trade Mechanism: A Capital-Constrained Supply Chain Incorporating Risk Aversion. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2020. Vol. 2020, no. 2020, pp.1-17.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-1202303

Data Type

Journal Articles

Language

English

Notes

Includes bibliographical references

Record ID

BIM-1202303