Analysis of the RDEU Game Model in Mass Emergencies with Maintained Legal Rights by Emotion

Abstract EN

The emotional factor in mass emergencies with maintained legal rights significantly influences the decision-making of the powerful and vulnerable groups and the course of events.

In this paper, we established the game model of rank-dependent expected utility for the powerful and vulnerable groups in mass emergencies with maintained legal rights.

And we also explored the influence of different emotional states on the results of strategic equilibrium of both sides of a game.

Results show that the behaviours of the powerful or vulnerable groups are not only affected by the choice of their other strategies, but also influenced by the degree of emotion.

The more optimistic they are, the more inclined they are to solve the mass emergencies with maintained legal rights; the more pessimistic they are, the more inclined they are to take extreme resistance behaviours and the more likely pessimism is to adversely affect the two groups’ behaviour choices.

The numerical simulation with MATLAB further validates this conclusion.

Therefore, the emotions of both sides should be controlled and understood when managing mass emergencies to solve problems effectively and reasonably.