Study on Stochastic Differential Game Model in Network Attack and Defense

Abstract EN

In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been gradually applied to analyze and predict network attack and defense for maintaining cybersecurity.

The traditional deterministic game model cannot accurately describe the process of actual network attack and defense due to changing in the set of attack-defense strategies and external factors (such as the operating environment of the system).

In this paper, we construct a stochastic evolutionary game model by the stochastic differential equation with Markov property.

The evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is found and the stability of the model is proved according to the knowledge of the stochastic differential equation.

And we apply the explicit Euler numerical method to analyze the evolution of the strategy selection of the players for different problem situations.

The simulation results show that the stochastic evolutionary game model proposed in this paper can get a steady state and obtain the optimal defense strategy under the action of the stochastic disturbance factor.

In addition, compared with other kinds of literature, we can conclude that the return on security investment of this model is better, and the strategy selection of the attackers and defenders in our model is more suitable for actual network attack and defense.