Optimal Network Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Network Game

Abstract EN

The basic hypothesis of evolutionary game theory is that the players in the game possess limited rationality.

The interactive behavior of players can be described by a learning mechanism that has theoretical advantages in modeling the network security problem in a real society.

The current network security evolutionary game model generally adopts a replicator dynamic learning mechanism and assumes that the interaction between players in the group conforms to the characteristics of uniform mixed distribution.

However, in an actual network attack and defense scenario, the players in the game have limited learning capability and can only interact with others within a limited range.

To address this, we improved the learning mechanism based on the network topology, established the learning object set based on the learning range of the players, used the Fermi function to calculate the transition probability to the learning object strategy, and employed random noise to describe the degree of irrational influence in the learning process.

On this basis, we built an attack and defense evolutionary network game model, analyzed the evolutionary process of attack and defense strategy, solved the evolution equilibrium, and designed a defense strategy selection algorithm.

The effectiveness of the model and method is verified by conducting simulation experiments for the transition probability of the players and the evolutionary process of the defense group strategy.