Active Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Two-Way Signaling Game

Abstract EN

Most network security research studies based on signaling games assume that either the attacker or the defender is the sender of the signal and the other party is the receiver of the signal.

The attack and defense process is commonly modeled and analyzed from the perspective of one-way signal transmission.

Aiming at the reality of two-way signal transmission in network attack and defense confrontation, we propose a method of active defense strategy selection based on a two-way signaling game.

In this paper, a two-way signaling game model is constructed to analyze the network attack and defense processes.

Based on the solution of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a defense strategy selection algorithm is presented.

The feasibility and effectiveness of the method are verified using examples from real-world applications.

In addition, the mechanism of the deception signal is analyzed, and conclusions for guiding the selection of active defense strategies are provided.