Security Measurement for Unknown Threats Based on Attack Preferences

Abstract EN

Security measurement matters to every stakeholder in network security.

It provides security practitioners the exact security awareness.

However, most of the works are not applicable to the unknown threat.

What is more, existing efforts on security metric mainly focus on the ease of certain attack from a theoretical point of view, ignoring the “likelihood of exploitation.” To help administrator have a better understanding, we analyze the behavior of attackers who exploit the zero-day vulnerabilities and predict their attack timing.

Based on the prediction, we propose a method of security measurement.

In detail, we compute the optimal attack timing from the perspective of attacker, using a long-term game to estimate the risk of being found and then choose the optimal timing based on the risk and profit.

We design a learning strategy to model the information sharing mechanism among multiattackers and use spatial structure to model the long-term process.

After calculating the Nash equilibrium for each subgame, we consider the likelihood of being attacked for each node as the security metric result.

The experiment results show the efficiency of our approach.