Multiple Impossible Differentials Cryptanalysis on 7-Round ARIA-192

Abstract EN

This paper studies the security of 7-round ARIA-192 against multiple impossible differentials cryptanalysis.

We propose six special 4-round impossible differentials which have the same input difference and different output difference with the maximum number of nonzero common bytes.

Based on these differentials, we construct six attack trails including the maximum number of common subkey bytes.

Under such circumstances, we utilize an efficient sieving process to improve the efficiency of eliminating common subkeys; therefore, both data and time complexities are reduced.

Furthermore, we also present an efficient algorithm to recover the master key via guess-and-determine technique.

Taking advantage of the above advances, we have obtained the best result so far for impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA-192, with time, data, and memory complexities being 2189.8 7-round ARIA encryptions, 2116.6 chosen plaintexts, and 2139.3 bytes, respectively.