Design and Analysis of Push Notification-Based Malware on Android

Abstract EN

Establishing secret command and control (C&C) channels from attackers is important in malware design.

This paper presents design and analysis of malware architecture exploiting push notification services as C&C channels.

The key feature of the push notification-based malware design is remote triggering, which allows attackers to trigger and execute their malware by push notifications.

The use of push notification services as covert channels makes it difficult to distinguish this type of malware from other normal applications also using the same services.

We implemented a backdoor prototype on Android devices as a proof-of-concept of the push notification-based malware and evaluated its stealthiness and feasibility.

Our malware implementation effectively evaded the existing malware analysis tools such as 55 antimalware scanners from VirusTotal and SandDroid.

In addition, our backdoor implementation successfully cracked about 98% of all the tested unlock secrets (either PINs or unlock patterns) in 5 seconds with only a fraction (less than 0.01%) of the total power consumption of the device.

Finally, we proposed several defense strategies to mitigate push notification-based malware by carefully analyzing its attack process.

Our defense strategies include filtering subscription requests for push notifications from suspicious applications, providing centralized management and access control of registration tokens of applications, detecting malicious push messages by analyzing message contents and characteristic patterns demonstrated by malicious push messages, and detecting malware by analyzing the behaviors of applications after receiving push messages.