Two-Round Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from Lattices

Abstract EN

Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows participants sharing low-entropy passwords to agree on cryptographically strong session keys over insecure networks.

In this paper, we present two PAKE protocols from lattices in the two-party and three-party settings, respectively, which can resist quantum attacks and achieve mutual authentication.

The protocols in this paper achieve two rounds of communication by carefully utilizing the splittable properties of the underlying primitive, a CCA (Chosen-Ciphertext Attack)-secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme with associated nonadaptive approximate smooth projection hash (NA-ASPH) system.

Compared with other related protocols, the proposed two-round PAKE protocols have relatively less communication and computation overhead.

In particular, the two-round 3PAKE is more practical in large-scale communication systems.